War and Rural Development in Africa: by Swift, Jeremy
Several articles in this Bulletin were first given as
seminars in a series in the Institute of Development
Studies in autumn 1994. This addressed a key
question facing rural development analysts and
practitioners: does the upsurge in armed conflict
in Africa, especially pronounced since the end of
the Cold War, mean we need a new or additional
agenda for rural development? This Bulletin
explores in greater detail some of the issues raised
in that seminar series.
It is clear that rural development thinking can no
longer claim that conflict falls outside its mandate.
Conflict is too widespread and too destructive.
Wars, civil conflict and banditry characterize large
areas of the poorest parts of the continent, and
while some conflicts (South Africa, Mozambique,
perhaps Mali) are on the way to being solved,
others (Sudan, the Great Lakes, perhaps Kenya)
continue or are getting worse. Large numbers of
deaths, as often civilians as soldiers, the destruction
of rural capital and infrastructure, loss of harvests
and livestock, the disappearance of governance
from the countryside (in places from the towns as
well), the erosion of civil society and the reemer-
gence of ethnicity as a rallying point, have created
new situations. Donors and non-government orga-
nizations are devoting more resources and time to
conflicts, and new organizations are being created
whose mandate is conflict. Researchers also need
to respond. As this Bulletin shows, they have
important insights, which can help us understand
what is happening and why, and guide new poli-
cies and activities.
The scope of this Bulletin is modest. Conflict is a
huge canvas, and we have not tried to paint it all.
Rather, we explore five issues which should be on
the agenda of rural development in Africa (and also
South Asia, and perhaps eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union). Some are a viewing of a
familiar rural development theme through the
prism of conflict, others are new departures for
the economists, natural resource specialists, agron-
omists, anthropologists and political scientists who
dominate the development community The over-
all message is that if we are to face the issue of
conflict effectively we need to learn new skills,
cover new literatures, and talk to new kinds of
specialist, to enable us to do our own work with
new perspectives.
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Understanding Conflict Better
The first task is to contribute to a better under-
standing of the causes, conduct and consequences
of war in Africa. Recent work by several scholars
on 'complex political emergencies' has begun to
illuminate the special characteristics of contempo-
rary African warfare. In his contribution to this
Bulletin, Alex de Waal develops some of these
lines of enquiry. Three processes are particularly
important.
The first, fuelled by the loss of patronage by Great
Power sponsors and economic decline in many
African countries, is the development of new forms
of economic activity by the military; often based on
predatory warfare on the population of their own
country. An important process of military accumu-
lation is taking place in several countries, most
notably Sudan, through the control by armed for-
mations (the formal military or others) of economic
enterprises related to the war, of resources such as
diamonds, ivory, timber or drugs, of donor-spon-
sored food aid programmes to war victims, and of
commerce in war zones. Everywhere in Africa, civil
unrest provides the occasion for seizure of assets,
especially livestock, from civilian non-combatants,
and in Kenya and Tanzania livestock raiding as a
form of predatory capital accumulation by non-pas-
toralists has become common; in Sudan this has
been taken a further step with the seizure of south-
ern civilians as slaves for the North. In West Africa,
some of the most vicious fighting has been over
control of diamond fields. The development of
these new forms of war economy have solved the
problem of how to maintain conventional and
unconventional armed forces in the field, and how
to motivate them.
Arising from these new forms of war economy, war-
fare has been decentralized. De Waal argues that in
several countries this was initially the result of a
deliberate fragmentation of military authority,
which enabled the regime to play one faction of the
military off against another in order to reduce the
threat of a coup. The result has been more decen-
tralized, locally-specific types of military organiza-
tion, and the creation of proxy forces; in Sudan this
Robert D. Putnam, 1992, Making Democracy Work:
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University
Press.
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has been taken to its logical conclusion, with the
government sub-contracting part of its war with the
South to northern tribal militias. Although the
process is poorly documented, several cases of
extreme civil insecurity in places in addition to
South Sudan (for example pastoral areas of Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania) are almost certainly the
result of political or commercial sponsorship, arm-
ing and encouragement to minority ethnic groups
to 'raid their traditional enemies'.
The third process described by de Waal is particu-
larly sinister. A rapid process of innovation in mil-
itary techniques is occurring in African wars, based
on the successful adaptation of military doctrine
from elsewhere, with some apparently effective
local inventions. These include the development
from earlier models of locally-adapted counter-
insurgency and destabilization techniques, includ-
ing the use of exemplary terror and deliberate
exacerbation of ethnic rivalries, and the widespread
use of child soldiers. These trends reinforce the
movement towards decentralized, locally-specific,
forms of warfare.
The main lesson of de Waal's article is that we need
to think about African conflicts in new ways,
because so much that is happening is new and spe-
cific. We need to anchor these trends in a theoreti-
cal framework which helps us ask the right
questions, and relate these processes to wider social
and economic processes. It seems likely that pre-
sent thinking about social capital can help in this
respect. Social capital - those features of social
organization, such as trust, norms of reciprocity,
and networks of civic engagement, which make
possible cooperation and collective action for the
common good' - is one of the first casualties of war.
There is a two-way connection here: war, especially
civil war or community violence, destroys social
capital; but the absence, or destruction, of social
capital makes community violence and civil war
more likely
One of the most depressing features of de Waal's
account of trends in conflict in Africa is the way it
becomes apparent that social capital - the trust and
networks of civic engagement which are one of the
bases for survival in African rural societies - is being
deliberately targeted by many of the counter-insur-
gency and exemplary terror mechanisms he
describes. Not only are conflicts made worse, but
rehabilitation is made more difficult: in addition to
the reconstruction of physical capital which is
necessary there has to be a simultaneous or prior
reconstruction of social capital. While technical
assistance and outside investment can speed up
the first process, we know little about how to help
the latter. But at least if we recognize it is essential,
we may avoid some of the problems which arise
from ignoring it.
More Disaggregation
If war is becoming more varied and more locality-
specific, it is important to disaggregate our analysis.
Several articles in this collection describe the par-
ticular form taken by conflict in specific local cir-
cumstances, and show how hazardous it is to
generalize at this stage in our understanding.
Byrne gives a preliminary analysis of the way gen-
der cuts across all the other lines - ethnic, cultural,
religious, or national - along which conflict is orga-
nized. Conflict tends to redefine notions of mas-
culinity and femininity, and the allocation of
gendered responsibilities often changes for the
duration of the conflict. Women are allocated new
roles: commonly they are assigned the role of bearer
of culture, which can erode rights and restrict
mobility, but this role may also make them espe-
cially vulnerable to attack by soldiers from the other
side. Women also often acquire new economic
roles, replacing men who are drafted into the armed
forces, which may also open up new rights and
responsibilities. When the conflict ends, there is a
process of renegotiation of gender identities:
women may be able to formalize their increased
participation in public life and defend their new
roles; but they may also find they are vulnerable at
this moment, and lose advantages they had acquired.
Emergency relief distribution during or after con-
flict is especially in need of a more disaggregated
gender analysis. The common pattern of targeting
household heads for relief may undermine women's
normal responsibilities for household management
and food allocation.
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The article by Hendricksen, Mearns and Armon
explores livestock raiding in Turkana in Northern
Kenya. The common perception is that the
Turkana, like other pastoral groups in Africa, have a
long tradition of raiding, which has been made
more dangerous by the introduction of modern
small arms. Hendricksen et al. show that in fact
there has not been a simple evolution from custom-
ary to contemporary raiding, but that they are two
very different things with different causes and con-
sequences. The traditional, redistributive raiding
was internal to the pastoral economy, and was in
some respects livelihood-enhancing, since it pro-
vided a chance for poor households to rebuild
herds and reduce vulnerability; mainly young men
in the warrior age-set were at risk. Contemporary,
predatory raiding occurs on a much larger scale, the
identities and motives of the main actors are differ-
ent, the impact on pastoral livelihoods is much
more serious, and everyone is at risk, with women
and children especially vulnerable. The profile of
the winners and losers changes: increasingly, win-
ners are outside actors, including those who spon-
sor such raids for political or economic reasons,
while all pastoralists in the raided area are losers.
Predatory raiding creates large scale covariate risk,
often making large areas of good grazing unusable,
and in combination with drought or other disrup-
tion of livelihood systems can trigger acute food
insecurity.and famine.
Conflict Resolution
With a rise in the number of conflicts, better proce-
dures for conflict resolution become imperative.
There is beginning to be a useful literature on this,
especially involving NGO attempts to use custom-
ary conflict-resolution methods.
Less well known is the South African experience in
handling conflicts, some of which is summarized
by Cousins. South Africa is a rich source of ideas
for people involved in conflicts in other parts of
Africa. Cousins points out that our changing
understanding of the nature of ecological processes
in dry areas of Africa - non-equilibrium ecological
systems theory - which puts more emphasis on vari-
ability in natural resource availability, should
change the way we think of conflicts over natural
resources, and make them, and procedures for
resolving them, central to our concerns. The focus
of the administration of agropastoral areas in par-
ticular should shift from the regulation and control
of resource use to mediation and arbitration
between conflicting interests and groups.
To assist in this process, Cousins describes negoti-
ating principles derived from the professional liter-
ature on conflict resolution, including the
recognition that conflict is endemic, can serve use-
ful as well as destructive functions, and can often be
accommodated constructively. 'Where gross injus-
tice is built into social structures, however, funda-
mental structural change is necessary. As a sort of
halfway house, in conflicts where there are great
asymmetries of power between protagonists, a pre-
liminary process of empowering the weaker party to
the conflict is essential before meaningful negotia-
tions can start. A move away from formal judicial
processes towards alternative, including customary
dispute resolution methods will often be necessary
Post-conflict Rehabilitation
Rehabilitation after conflict is in some respects a
more extreme form of rehabilitation after drought,
and suffers from some of the same preconceptions
of donors.
In a detailed case history of agricultural rehabilita-
tion in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, Pottier
shows how some of the agencies involved had a
powerful disaster narrative of what was needed, and
were guided by this despite mounting evidence that
this was not the case. The supposed near-total loss
of locally-adapted plant genetic material triggered
a response which would perhaps have been appro-
priate had the diagnosis been correct. But it wasn't.
Farmers and markets were more resilient than
expected, and conditions were highly variable,
leading to great variety in the availability of seeds
for the following planting season. A blanket
response to supply seeds from outside was clearly
inappropriate; it would have been better to have
helped market channels work better, and to create
opportunities for migrant wage labour. The com-
parison with misplaced blanket food aid as a
response to famines is striking.
The lesson of Pottier's research is that post-conflict
rehabilitation must be guided by careful case by
case assessment, in a participatory manner with the
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surviving populations, and not be governed mainly
by media images or what is convenient for donors.
In the trade-off between speed of action and careful
planning, there will sometimes be a case for less
speed and more preliminary study
New Partners
If rural development is to take up the challenge of
conflict, we will have to be open to the need for
new alliances with professionals in different fields.
Two are represented here.
Parker describes how there is an increasing trend
for Northern agencies to concern themselves with
the psychiatric health and well-being of people
who have survived violent conflict, and to respond
by sending out specialist counsellors or therapists.
She questions the wisdom of this: we know too lit-
tle about the way non-Western cultures respond to
extreme violence, and it is likely that the available
repertoire of therapeutic responses is inadequate
or inappropriate. The behaviour of trauma victims
is determined by local concepts of causality, pain,
accountability and guilt. Inappropriate Western
concepts about these things could easily inform
policy in the wrong directions, leading yet again to
a response based on premises owing more to the
abilities and needs of agencies than those of the
survivors of the conflict.
Military humanitarianism, and an increased role for
peacekeeping forces under multilateral or single
nation command, have grown spectacularly and
seem bound to continue to grow Slim's article doc-
uments the way the military have come to terms
with and conceptualized this. Traditional UN
peacekeeping depended on three key principles:
consent by the parties to the conflict to the inter-
vention; the use of minimum force; and the impar-
tiality of the intervening forces. Recent events have
changed much of this, and the UN has in places
taken on a war-fighting role, both unsuccessfully (in
Somalia), and more successfully in Bosnia. Slim
shows how thinking has evolved in the British army
about the overriding importance of consent in
peace keeping. Given the increasingly important
role played by the military in conflicts in Africa, it is
important for researchers to understand better what
their thinking is, and what is guiding them.
Conflicts are going to be a key part of the situation responding to this agenda, which will take them
facing rural development in Africa for the foresee- outside their habitual tracks. This Bulletin starts to
able future. Researchers have a duty to start map out some of these new areas.
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